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This work studies the impact of cost-sharing methods on the existence and efficiency of (pure) Nash equilibria
in weighted congestion games. We also study generalized weighted congestion games, where each player may
control multiple commodities. Our results are fairly general, we only require that our cost-sharing method and
our set of cost functions satisfy certain natural conditions. For general weighted congestion games, we study
the existence of pure Nash equilibria in the induced games and we exhibit a separation from the standard
single-commodity per player model by proving that the Shapley value is the only cost-sharing method that
guarantees existence of pure Nash equilibria. With respect to efficiency, we present general tight bounds on
the price of anarchy, which are robust and apply to general equilibrium concepts. Our analysis provides a
tight bound on the price of anarchy, which depends only on the used cost-sharing method and the set of
allowable cost functions. Interestingly, the same bound applies to weighted congestion games and generalized
weighted congestion games. We then turn to the price of stability and prove an upper bound for the Shapley
value cost-sharing method, which holds for general sets of cost functions and which is tight in special cases of
interest, such as bounded degree polynomials. Also for bounded degree polynomials, we provide a somewhat
surprising result, showing that a slight deviation from the Shapley value has a huge impact on the price of
stability. In fact, for this case, the price of stability becomes as bad as the price of anarchy. Again, our bounds
on the price of stability are independent on whether players are single or multi-commodity.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The class of weighted congestion games [27, 29] encapsulates a large collection of important
applications in the study of solution concepts and inefficiencies induced by strategic behavior in
large systems. The applications that fall within this framework involve a set of players who place
demands on a set of resources and one of the most prominent such applications is selfish routing in
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a telecommunication or traffic network [3, 8, 34]. When total demand on a resource is increased,
the resource becomes more scarce and the quality of service experienced by its users degrades.
More specifically, in a weighted congestion game, there is a set of players N and a set of resources E.
Each player i ∈ N has a positive weightwi and she gets to select the subset of the resources that
she will use. The possible subsets of resources are given in her set of possible strategies Pi . Once
players make their decisions, each resource e ∈ E generates a joint costCe (fe ), where fe is the total
weight of the users of e and Ce is the cost function of e . The joint cost of resource e is paid by her
users Se , i.e.,
∑
i ∈Se χie = Ce (fe ), where χie is the cost share of player i on resource e .
In many applications of interest, there is motivation to focus on a more general model where
each player controls multiple commodities with their own weight and set of available strategies. In
the selfish routing example, players might control multiple flows in the graph and each commodity
has its own source, destination and weight. Settings such as routing road traffic controlled by
competing ride-sharing applications or routing Internet traffic controlled by competing service
providers lie within this framework. In this more general model, f ie is the combined flow placed
on resource e by player i , which might be the sum of multiple commodities. The total flow on the
resource is then fe =
∑
i ∈N f
i
e and, as previously, the joint cost must be covered by the players who
assign some flow on e , i.e.,
∑
i :f ie >0 χie = Ce (fe ).
The way the cost shares χie are calculated is given by the cost-sharing method used in the game.
A cost-sharing method determines the cost-shares of the players on a resource, given the joint cost
that each subset of them generates, i.e., the cost shares are functions of the state on that resource
alone. In most applications of interest, it is important that the cost-sharing method possesses this
locality property, since we expect the system designer’s control method to scale well with the size of
the system and to behave well as resources are dynamically added to or removed from the system.
Altering our cost-sharing method of choice changes the individual player costs. Given that our
candidate outcomes are expected to be game-theoretic equilibrium solutions, this modification
of the individual player costs also changes the possible outcomes players can reach. The price of
anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) measure the performance of a cost-sharing method by
comparing the worst and best equilibrium, respectively, to the optimal solution, and taking the
worst-case ratio over all instances.
Certain examples of cost-sharing methods include proportional sharing (PS) and the Shapley value
(SV). In PS, the cost share of a player is proportional to her flow, i.e., χie = (f
i
e /fe ) ·Ce (fe ), while
the SV of a player on a resource e is her average marginal cost increase over a uniform ordering
of the players in Se . Other than different PoA and PoS values, different cost-sharing methods also
possess different equilibrium existence properties. The pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) is the most
widely accepted solution concept in such games. In a PNE, no player can improve her cost with
a unilateral deviation to another strategy. In a mixed Nash equilibrium (MNE) players randomize
over strategies and no player can improve her expected cost by picking a different distribution over
strategies. By Nash’s famous theorem, a MNE is guaranteed to exist in every weighted congestion
game. However, existence of a PNE is not guaranteed for some cost-sharing methods. As examples,
in routing games with single-commodity players, PS does not guarantee existence of a PNE (see e.g.
[11, 16] and [19] for a characterization), while the SV does for players with a single commodity [25].
Gopalakrishnan et al. [17] showed that only the class of generalized weighted Shapley values (see
Section 2 for a definition) guarantees the existence of a PNE in games with single-commodity
players.
As a metric that is worst-case by nature, the PoA of a cost-sharing method that does not always
induce a PNE must be measured with respect to more general concepts, such as the MNE, which
are guaranteed to exist. Luckily, PoA upper bounds are typically robust [31] which means they
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apply to MNE and even more general classes (such as correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria).
On the other hand, the motivation behind the study of the PoS assumes a PNE will exist, hence the
PoS is more meaningful when the cost-sharing method does guarantee a PNE.
1.1 Assumptions
For most of our results, we naturally assume the following (see Section 2 for more details):
(1) Every cost function in the game is continuous, nondecreasing, and convex.
(2) All players are charged only according to their contribution to the joint resource cost.
(3) The cost share of a player on a resource is a convex function of her weight on it.
Assumption 1 is standard in congestion-type settings. For example, linear cost functions have
obvious applications in many network models, as do queuing delay functions, while higher degree
polynomials (such as quartic) have been proposed as realistic models of road traffic [36]. Assump-
tion 2 states that the cost share of a player only depends on how much the player impacts the
joint cost function of a resource and there is no discrimination between players in any other way.
Assumption 3 states that the curvature of the cost shares function should be consistent with the
convexity of the resource cost function (given by Assumption 1), i.e., the share of a player on a
resource is a convex function of her weight. Without this assumption, we land in a setting where
increasing the weight of a player i will increase i’s cost share at a slower rate than that of another
player j whose weight remains constant, something we view as unnatural.
1.2 Contribution
Our contributions lie on two aspects: existence and efficiency of equilibria. In particular, we focus
on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, on the price of anarchy and the price of stability.
PNE existence: It is known that generalized weighted Shapley values are the only methods that
guarantee existence of a PNE in games with single-commodity players [17]. In this work we prove
that the SV continues to guarantee the existence of a PNE even in games with multi-commodity
players and cost functions as stated in Assumption 1 (Theorem 3.1). We then exhibit a separation
from the single-commodity case by proving that a subclass of weighted Shapley values do not
guarantee existence of a PNE when we have multi-commodity players (Theorem 3.2). Given that
the class of weighted Shapley values are the unique cost-sharing methods that guarantee pure Nash
equilibria in the single-commodity player model [17], our results suggest that the Shapley value is
essentially the unique anonymous cost-sharing method that guarantees pure Nash equilibria in the
multi-commodity player model.
General PoA bounds: On the PoA side, we present tight bounds for general classes of allowable cost
functions and for general cost-sharing methods (satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, 3), i.e., we parameterize
the PoA by (i) the set of allowable cost functions (which changes depending on the application
under consideration) and (ii) the cost-sharing method (Theorem 4.2). We note that our upper bound
is robust and applies to general equilibrium concepts that are guaranteed to exist for all cost-sharing
methods. Our upper bound applies to games with multi-commodity players, while our lower bound
uses an instance with single-commodity players, which proves that the PoA coincides for the two
models.
PoS bounds for Shapley Values: Studying the PoS is best motivated in settings where a trusted
mediator or some other authority can place the players in an initial configuration from which they
will not be willing to deviate. For this reason, the PoS is a very interesting concept, especially for
games possessing a PNE. Hence, we focus on cost-sharing methods which always induce games
with a PNE (at least in the single-commodity model). For SV cost sharing, we prove an upper
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bound on the PoS which holds for all sets of cost functions that satisfy Assumption 1 (Theorem
5.1). We show that for the interesting case of polynomials of bounded degree d , this upper bound is
d + 1 (Corollary 5.3), which is asymptotically tight and always very close to the exact value given
by Christodoulou and Gairing [7].
Moreover, we show that this linear dependence on the maximum degree d is very fragile. To do
so, we consider a parameterized class of weighted Shapley values, where players with larger weight
get an advantage or disadvantage, which is determined by a single parameter γ . When γ = 0 this
recovers the SV. For all other values γ , 0, we show (Theorem 5.8 and Theorem 5.10) that the PoS is
very close and, for γ > 0, even matches the upper bound on the price of anarchy by Gkatzelis et al.
[15]. In other words, for this case the PoS and the PoA coincide, which we found very surprising
due to the fact that the upper bound in [15] applies even to general cost-sharing methods. We note
that these weighted Shapley values are the only cost-sharing methods that guarantee existence of a
PNE in games with single-commodity players and satisfy Assumption 2 [15, 17]. Similarly to our
PoA bounds, our PoS upper bound applies to games with multi-commodity players, while the lower
bounds construct instances with single-commodity players, hence obtaining the desired generality.
1.3 Related work and comparison to our results
In this section, we discuss the related work (which is mostly for the single-commodity case) on
PNE existence, price of anarchy and price of stability, and compare it with our findings.
PNE existence: In weighted congestion games with single-commodity players, the most common
method for sharing the total cost of a resource among her users is the proportional sharing, which,
unfortunately, lacks the desirable property of guaranteeing existence of pure Nash equilibria (see
examples by Fotakis et al. [11], and Goemans et al. [16]). However, PNE exist, if we allow only
affine [11] or only exponential resource cost functions [19]; Harks and Klimm [19] show that those
are the only classes of costs functions that guarantee this property. Harks et al. [20] characterize
the existence of potential functions in weighted congestion games under proportional sharing.
Using Shapley values instead of proportional sharing, Kollias and Roughgarden [25] show that also
such games are potential games. A characterization for a much wider class of cost-sharing methods
was given by Gopalakrishnan et al. [17]. More specifically, [17] shows that the only cost-sharing
method that guarantees pure Nash equilibria in games is a generalization of weighted Shapley
values.
A number of previous works [11, 23, 30, 37] study settings that share similarities to routing
games with multi-commodity players. Rosenthal [30] studies weighted congestion games where
each player may split her integer flow size among different sub-flows of integer size. Focusing on
proportional sharing, Rosenthal [30] proves that there exist such games with no PNE. Tran-Thanh
et al. [37] identify special cases where PNE exist in Rosenthal’s model. Our approach differs from
the work in [30] and [37], as we allow multi-commodity players, i.e., we do not restrict to players
who control unit flows with the same start vertex. Fotakis et al. [11] focus on coalitions of atomic
players in routing games (equivalent to multi-commodity players) and mostly on the objective of
minimizing the maximum cost. For the sum of costs objective (which we consider in this paper),
they prove that the game always admits a PNE under PS and quadratic edge cost functions. With
respect to existence of PNE, we provide comprehensive results for more general methods and more
general classes of cost functions.
PoA:. The notion of price of anarchy was proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in [26],
and most of the work on efficiency of equilibria for weighted congestion games has focused on
proportional sharing and single-commodity players. More specifically, for linear cost functions,
Awerbuch et al. [3] and, Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [8] obtain tight bounds, while Gairing
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and Schoppmann [14] prove PoA bounds for multiple classes of singleton congestion games. For
the interesting class of polynomial cost functions, Aland et al. [1] provide the exact PoA value.
Roughgarden [31] generalized the technique used in [1, 3, 8] to hold for general cost functions,
defined it as the smoothness framework, and showed that PoA bounds obtained in this way are
robust, i.e., apply to general equilibrium concepts. Bhawalkar et al. [4] characterize the PoA in
weighted atomic congestion games as a function of the allowable resource cost functions.
Using Shapley values in weighted congestion games (as an alternative to proportional sharing),
is an approach introduced by Kollias and Roughgarden [25], who also give tight bounds on the
PoA. Gkatzelis et al. [15] show that, among all cost-sharing methods that guarantee PNE existence
in weighted congestion games, the Shapley value minimizes the worst-case PoA. With respect
to proportional sharing, they show that it is near optimal in general, for convex cost functions
and single-commodity players. Klimm and Schmand [24], and Roughgarden and Schrijvers [33],
also discuss the optimality of the SV for the extended model with non-anonymous costs given by
set functions. Network cost-sharing games with fixed resource costs were studied by Chen et al.
[6] while variants of it were studied by von Falkenhausen and Harks [38] and Christodoulou and
Sgouritsa [9]. Note that our model is different to the ones with fixed resource costs as the latter
allow concave resource cost functions (which we disallow). To see this, consider a resource with
any fixed resource cost, i.e., ce (ne ) = 2 for any ne > 0 and ce (ne ) = 0 for ne = 0 (any empty resource
generates zero cost), which gives a concave function. In our setting but for different cost-sharing
methods, Harks and Miller [21] give efficiency bounds that depend on the cost functions and
the cost-sharing methods. The methods they study are (a) average cost-sharing, (b) marginal cost
pricing and (c) incremental cost-sharing. Similar to our generalized setting of congestion games
with multi-commodity players, is the setting of Hayrapetyan et al. [23]. They show that there exist
games where merging atomic players into a coalition may degrade the quality of the induced PNE
when PS is used. In a small contrast, we focus on worst-case metrics and show that the PoA and
PoS of multi-commodity games is no worse than the PoA and PoS of the single-commodity case,
for general cost-sharing methods.
In addition to extending to the case ofmulti-commodity players, our PoA results greatly generalize
the work on cost-sharing methods for weighted congestion games and give a recipe for tight bounds
in a large array of applications. Prior to our work, only a handful of cost-sharing methods have
been tightly analyzed. Our results facilitate the better design of such systems, beyond the optimality
criteria considered by Gkatzelis et al. [15]. For example, the SV has the drawback that it cannot be
computed efficiently, while PS (on top of not always inducing a PNE) might have equilibria that
are hard to compute. In cases where existence and efficient computation of a PNE is considered
important, the designer might opt for a different cost-sharing method, such as a priority based one
(that fixes a weight-dependent ordering of the players and charges them the marginal increase
they cause to the joint cost by entering the resource in this order), which has polynomial time
computable shares and equilibria. Our results show how the inefficiency of equilibria is quantified
for all such possible choices, to help evaluate the tradeoffs between different options. Our work
closely parallels the work on network cost-sharing games by Kollias and Roughgarden [25], which
provides tight bounds for general cost-sharing methods.
PoS. The term price of stability was introduced by Anshelevich et al. in [2] for the network
cost-sharing games, which was further studied for weighted players and various cost-sharing
methods by Chen and Roughgarden [5], Chen et al. [6], and Kollias and Roughgarden [25]. With
respect to congestion games, results on the PoS are only known for polynomial unweighted games
and single-commodity players, for which Christodoulou and Gairing [7] provide exact bounds.
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Our PoS upper bound is the first for weighted congestion games that applies to any class of
convex costs. Roughgarden and Schoppmann present SV PoS bounds in a more general setting
with non-anonymous but submodular cost functions [33]. In a similar vein, Klimm and Schmand
[24] present tight PoS bounds on the SV in games with non-anonymous costs, by allowing any
cost function and parameterizing by the number of players in the game, i.e., they show that for
the set of all cost functions the PoS of the SV is Θ(n logn) and for the set of supermodular cost
functions it becomes n, where n is the number of players. These upper bounds apply to our games
as well, however we adopt a slightly different approach. We allow an infinite number of players for
our bounds to hold and parameterize by the set of possible cost functions, to capture the PoS of
different applications. For example, for polynomials of degree at most d , we show that the PoS is at
most d + 1. Observe that for unweighted games PS and SV are identical. Thus, the lower bound
by Christodoulou and Gairing [7], which approaches d + 1, also applies to our setting, showing
that our bound for polynomials is asymptotically tight.
Our lower bounds on the PoS for the parameterized class of weighted Shapley values build on
the corresponding lower bounds on the PoA by Gkatzelis et al. [15]. Our construction matches
these bounds by ensuring that the instance possesses a unique Nash equilibrium. Together with our
upper bound this shows an interesting contrast: For the special case of SV the PoS is exponentially
better than the PoA, but as soon as we give some weight dependent priorities to the players, the
PoA and the PoS essentially coincide.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section we present the notation and preliminaries for our model in terms of a weighted
congestion game with multi-commodity players. In such a game, there is a set Q of k commodities
which are partitioned into n ≤ k non-empty and disjoint subsets Q1,Q2, . . .Qn . Each set of com-
modities Qi , for i = 1, 2, . . . ,n, is controlled by an independent player. Denote N = {1, 2, . . . ,n}
the set of players. The players in N share access to a set of resources E. Each resource e ∈ E has a
cost function Ce : R≥0 → R≥0.
Strategies. Each commodity q ∈ Q has a set of possible strategies Pq ⊆ 2E . Associated with
each commodity q is a weightwq , which has to be allocated to a strategy in P
q
. For a player i , a
strategy Pi = (Pq)q∈Qi defines the strategy for each commodity q player i controls. An outcome P =
(P1, P2, . . . , Pn) is a tuple of strategies of the n players.
Resource load. For an outcome P , the flow f ie (P) of a player i on resource e equals the sum of the
weights of all her commodities using e , i.e., f ie (P) =
∑
q∈Qi ,e ∈Pq wq . For anyT ⊆ N , denote f
T
e (P) =
(f ie (P))i ∈T the vector of flows on e restricted to players inT . The total flow on a resource e is given
by fe (P) =
∑
i ∈N f
i
e (P), while the set of users of e (players who assign positive flow on e) for an
outcome P is given by Se (P).
Cost shares. The cost-sharing method of the game determines how the flow-dependent joint cost
of a resource Ce (fe (P)) is divided among its users. For any T ⊆ N , let f
T
e (P) be the vector of the
flows that each player in T assigns to e . Then the cost share of player i is defined as a function
of the player’s identity, the vector of flows assigned to e and the resource’s cost function, i.e.,
χie (P) = ξ (i, f
T
e (P),Ce ). Note that there is no resource dependent cost-sharing methods and that
the cost shares are computed only based on the players in T . For a resource e , the cost shares are
such that
∑
i ∈Se (P ) χie (P) = Ce (fe (P)). The total cost of a player is Xi (P) =
∑
e ∈Pi χie (P) and the
social cost of the game is given by the sum of the player costs,
SC(P) =
∑
i ∈N
∑
e ∈E
χie (P) =
∑
i ∈N
∑
e ∈E
ξ (i, f Ne (P),Ce ) =
∑
e ∈E
Ce (fe (P)). (1)
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On the cost-sharing method and the set of allowable cost functions, we make three natural
assumptions:
(1) The cost functions of the game are drawn from a given set C of allowable cost functions,
such that every C ∈ C must be continuous, increasing and convex. We also make the mild
technical assumption that C is closed under dilation, i.e., that ifC(x) ∈ C, then alsoC(a ·x) ∈ C
for a > 0. Without loss of generality, every C is also closed under scaling, i.e., if C(x) ∈ C,
then also a ·C(x) ∈ C for a > 0 (this is given by simple scaling and replication arguments).
(2) The second assumption states that the cost-sharing method only charges players based on
how they contribute to the joint cost. We formally state this assumption in two parts:
(a) Suppose resource e with players i1, i2, . . . , ik and resource e
′
with players i ′
1
, i ′
2
, . . . , i ′k are
such that, for every set of indices I , we have:
Ce
(∑
j ∈I
f
i j
e
)
= Ce ′
(∑
j ∈I
f
i′j
e ′
)
.
Then it should be the case that χi j ,e = χi′j ,e ′ for every index j.
(b) Suppose we scale the joint cost on a resource e by a positive factor α , i.e., C̄e (fe (P)) =
α ·Ce (fe (P)). The new cost shares of the players would be a scaled by factor α version of
their initial cost shares, i.e., χ̄ie = α · χie . This is necessary for the cost-sharing method to
be consistent, in the sense that, a resource with a cost function α ·Ce (fe (P)) should induce
the same costs to the players as α resources with a cost function Ce (fe (P)) each.
(3) Last, we assume that the cost share of a player on a resource is a continuous, increasing
and convex function of her flow. This is something to expect from a reasonable cost-sharing
method, given that the joint cost on the resource is a continuous increasing convex function
of the resource’s total flow fe (P).
Pure Nash equilibrium.We now proceed with the definition of our solution concept. The pure
Nash equilibrium (PNE) condition on an outcome P states that for every player i it must be the case
that ∑
e ∈E
χie (P) ≤
∑
e ∈E
χie (P
′
i , P−i ), for any other strategy P
′
i . (2)
Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. LetZ be the set of outcomes andZN be the set of pure
Nash equilibria outcomes of the game. Then the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability
(PoS) are defined as follows:
PoA =
maxP ∈ZN SC(P)
minP ∈Z SC(P)
and PoS =
minP ∈ZN SC(P)
minP ∈Z SC(P)
. (3)
The PoA and PoS for a class of games are defined as the largest such ratios among all games in the
class.
Weighted Shapley values. The weighted Shapley value defines how the cost Ce (·) of resource
e is distributed among the players using it. Given an ordering π of N , let F <i,πe (P) be the sum
of flows of players preceding i in π . Then the marginal cost increase caused by a player i’s flow
is Ce (F
<i,π
e (P) + f
i
e (P)) −Ce (F
<i,π
e (P)). For a given distribution Π over orderings, the cost share
of player i on e is Eπ∼Π[Ce (F
<i,π
e (P) + f
i
e (P)) −Ce (F
<i,π
e (P))]. For the weighted Shapley value, the
distribution over orderings is given by a sampling parameter λie (P) for each player i . The last flow in
the ordering is picked proportional to the sampling parameters λie (P). This process is then repeated
iteratively for the remaining players.
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As in [15], we study a parameterized class of weighted Shapley values defined by a parameter γ .
For this class λie (P) = f
i
e (P)
γ
for all players i and resources e . For γ = 0, this reduces to the
(unweighted) Shapley value, where we have a uniform distribution over orderings.
3 EXISTENCE OF PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this sectionwe focus on the existence of pure Nash equilibria. Recall that for the single-commodity
case, [17] characterized a generalization of weighted Shapley values as the only cost-sharing
methods to guarantee existence of pure Nash equilibria. As soon as we extend the model to
congestion games with multi-commodity players, our results in this section show a separation to
the result of [17]. We prove that the only cost-sharing method that admits pure Nash equilibria
restricts to Shapley values, where all players have identical sampling weights. More specifically,
while Shapley values still ensures PNE existence (see Theorem 3.1), already for a parameterized
class of weighted Shapley values PNE might not exist (see Theorem 3.2). We close the section with
a discussion on computing the cost shares on a per-commodity basis (see Theorem 3.4).
Theorem 3.1. Using the Shapley value to share player costs in congestion games with multi-
commodity players yields a potential game.
Proof. Consider any ordering π of the players in N and let f ≤i,πe (P) denote the vector that we
get after truncating f Ne (P) by removing all entries for players that succeed i in π . We prove that
the following function Φ() is a potential function of the game.
Φ(P) =
∑
e ∈E
∑
i ∈N
ξ (i, f ≤i,πe (P),Ce ).
The potential property we wish to prove is that, when player i unilaterally changes the outcome of
the game from P to (P ′i , P−i ), we get:
Φ(P) − Φ(P ′i , P−i ) =
∑
e ∈E
ξ (i, f Ne (P),Ce ) −
∑
e ∈E
ξ (i, f Ne (P
′
i , P−i ),Ce ).
It is clearly sufficient to prove this property per resource. Specifically, if the potential on each
resource e is defined as:
Φe (P) =
∑
i ∈N
ξ (i, f ≤i,πe (P),Ce ), (4)
then we need to prove:
Φe (P) − Φe (P
′
i , P−i ) = ξ (i, f
N
e (P),Ce ) − ξ (i, f
N
e (P
′
i , P−i ),Ce ). (5)
Hart and Mas-Colell [22] proved that (4) is independent of the ordering π in which player flows
are considered. We can then assume that π is such that player i goes last in the ordering and write
Φe (P) as:
Φe (P) =
∑
j ∈N , j,i
ξ (j, f ≤j,πe (P),Ce ) + ξ (i, f
N
e (P),Ce ).
Observe that using this last expression for Φe (), we get:
Φe (P) − Φe (P
′
i , P−i ) =
∑
j ∈N , j,i
ξ (j, f ≤j,πe (P),Ce ) + ξ (i, f
N
e (P),Ce )
−
∑
j ∈N , j,i
ξ (j, f ≤j,πe (P
′
i , P−i ),Ce ) − ξ (i, f
N
e (P
′
i , P−i ),Ce ). (6)
Note that, since i is the last one in the ordering and the only who changes strategy, we get
f ≤j,πe (P) = f
≤j,π
e (P
′
i , P−i ). Using this fact in (6) recovers (5) and completes the proof. □
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One might expect that, similarly to standard congestion games, the same potential function
argument would apply to weighted Shapley values as well. However, as we prove next, this is not
the case.
Theorem 3.2. There is a congestion game with multi-commodity players that admits no PNE for
any weighted Shapley value defined by sampling weights of the form f ie (P)
γ with γ , 0.
Proof. We prove this theorem by showing two examples admitting no PNE, for γ > 0 and
γ < 0. We start with the γ > 0 case. Consider two players, 1 and 2, who compete for two
parallel (meaning each commodity must pick exactly one of them) resources e ,e ′ with identical
cost functions Ce (x) = Ce ′(x) = x
1+δ
with δ > 0 and
γ
δ a large positive number (note that for
δ = 0, we have linear cost functions where in this case we have an equilibrium. As soon as we
deviate from linearity, we use convexity to construct an example with no equilibrium). Player 1
controls a unit commodity p ∈ Q1. Player 2 controls two commodities q,q
′ ∈ Q2, withwq′ = 1 and
wq = k , for k a very large number. Recall, that the sampling weight of a player i on a resource e is
given by λie = (f
i
e )
γ
. This means that smaller weights are favored when constructing the weighted
Shapley ordering.
We continue by proving the following lemma which we use in the instance afterwards.
Lemma 3.3. For any positive δ and ϵ , there exists some k sufficiently large such that
(1 + δ ) · kδ + k1+δ ≤ (k + 1)1+δ ≤ (1 + ϵ) · (1 + δ ) · kδ + k1+δ .
Proof. Given any δ > 0, we have that
lim
k→∞
(k + 1)1+δ − k1+δ
(1 + δ ) · kδ
= lim
k→∞
k1+δ
( (
1 + 1k
)
1+δ
− 1
)
(1 + δ ) · kδ
= lim
k→∞
(
1 + 1k
)
1+δ
− 11+δ
(1 + δ ) · 1k
=
(x1+δ )′ |x=1
1 + δ
= 1.
By definition of limit, we get that for every ϵ > 0, there exists aM such that (k + 1)1+δ − k1+δ(1 + δ ) · kδ − 1 < ϵ (7)
whenever k > M . Then, observe that both our inequalities follow from (7). □
Suppose, without loss of generality, that player 1 places commodity p on resource e . Then the
best response of player 2 is to place the large commodity q alone on e ′ and the small commodity q′
on e . To see this, note that player 2’s cost on this outcome will be
1
2
· (21+δ − 1) +
1
2
+ k1+δ = 2δ + k1+δ . (8)
Then we show that any other outcome results in a larger cost for player 2. First, let her large
commodity be assigned with commodity p of player 1 on resource e . This would result in a cost of
at least
1
1 + kγ
· k1+δ +
kγ
1 + kγ
· ((k + 1)1+δ − 1) + 1. (9)
By Lemma 3.3, we get that
(9) ≥
k1+δ + kγ ·
(
(1 + δ ) · kδ + k1+δ − 1
)
+ 1 + kγ
1 + kγ
= k1+δ +
(1 + δ ) · kγ+δ + 1
1 + kγ
. (10)
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Note that for large k , the second term is larger than 2δ . Therefore (10)> (8). If now both commodities
of player 2 were assigned on e ′, this would result in a cost of
(k + 1)1+δ
Lemma 3.3
≥
(
k1+δ + (1 + δ ) · kδ
)
> k1+δ + 2δ = (8).
We focus now on player 1. Her cost on resource e , given player 2’s best strategy, is
2
δ , (11)
which is a fixed number larger than 1, since δ > 0. We show that player 1 would prefer to assign
her commodity p on resource e ′, together with the large commodity q of player 2. In this outcome,
player 1’s cost would be
kγ
1 + kγ
· 1 +
1
1 + kγ
·
(
(k + 1)1+δ − k1+δ
) Lemma 3.3
≤
kγ
1 + kγ
+
(1 + ϵ) · (1 + δ ) · kδ
1 + kγ
. (12)
which approaches 1 for large enough k , since γ > δ . Thus, (12) < (11) which proves the desirable
deviation. Therefore there is no equilibrium.
We now switch to the case with γ < 0. Consider players i = 1, 2, . . . ,k , who compete for two
parallel resources e1, e2 with identical cost functions Ce1 (x) = Ce2 (x) = x
3
. Player k controls two
commodities p,q ∈ Qk with weights wp = k and wq = 1. Each player i < k controls only one
commodity ri ∈ Qi with wri = 1. The sampling weight of a player i on a resource e is given
by λie = (f
i
e )
γ
, for γ < 0. Assume player k assigns commodity p to resource e1 and commodity q
to e2. In this case, note that it is a dominant strategy for players 1, . . . ,k − 1 to use resource e2. For
player k , this gives a cost share of
1
k
·Ce2 (fe2 ) +Ce1 (fe1 ) = k
2 + k3. (13)
On the other hand, if she assigns commodity p to e2 and q to e1, by Lemma 5.6(b), her cost can be
arbitrarily close to 1+k3, for large k , which is strictly smaller than her previous cost (13). Therefore
there is no PNE, which completes the proof of Theorem 3.2. □
Alternative weighted Shapley value cost-sharing
One might consider a different way of generalizing weighted Shapley values to multi-commodity
congestion games: Based on the vector of commodity flows, compute the weighted Shapley value
for each commodity and charge a player the sum of the weighted Shapley values of the commodities
controlled by her. When all commodities have the same weight, then this cost-sharing method
coincides with proportional cost-sharing (i.e., every player pays a cost-share that is proportional to
her flow on any given resource). Below we use one such instance with unit commodities to prove
that all these methods do not guarantee pure Nash equilibrium existence.
Our instance is based on an example in [11], where Fotakis et al. prove that network unweighted
congestion games with linear resource cost functions and equal cardinality coalitions do not have
the finite improvement property, therefore they admit no potential function. Their example translates
to a restricted setting of our model where each player controls an equal number of unit commodities.
We strengthen their result by proving non-existence of pure Nash equilibria for congestion games
with multi-commodity players and cubic resource cost functions (we construct even a network
congestion game with no pure Nash equilibrium).
A similar example has already been given by Rosenthal [30]. However, Rosenthal’s example uses
concave cost functions, which we disallow in our setting. In contrast, our example only uses convex
functions.
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Table 1. Players’ costs in example of Theorem 3.4.
P1 P3
P2 20 + 8 5 + (13 − 9 · ϵ)
20 + 8 (16 − 9 · ϵ) + (13 − 9 · ϵ)
P4 20 + 7 5 + 13
20 + (2 − ϵ) (17 − 4 · ϵ) + (5 − 4 · ϵ)
sp
sp′
sq′
sq
tp
tp′
tq′
tq
x3 (1− ǫ) · x3
5 · x3
2 · x3 5 · x3
5 · x3
a b
c d e
f g
Fig. 1. The network congestion game in Corollary 3.5.
Theorem 3.4. There is a congestion game with multi-commodity players and cubic cost functions
that admits no pure Nash equilibrium under weighted Shapley value applied on commodity weights.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing an instance with unit commodities such that
best-response dynamics from any initial configuration cycles. This cycle is based on an example
in [11], where Fotakis et al. prove that network unweighted congestion games with linear delays
and equal cardinality coalitions do not have the finite improvement property, therefore they admit
no potential function. Their model translates to a setting of our model where each player controls
an equal number of unit commodities. We strengthen their result by proving non-existence of a
pure Nash equilibria for (network) congestion games with multi-commodity players and cubic cost
functions.
Consider two players, 1 and 2, who control two commodities each, p,q ∈ Q1 and p
′,q′ ∈ Q2 with
wp = wq = wp′ = wq′ = 1. There is a set of resources E = {1, 2, . . . , 6} with cost functions C1(x) =
C5(x) = C6(x) = 5 ·x
3
,C2(x) = x
3
,C4(x) = 2 ·x
3
andC3(x) = (1−ϵ) ·x
3
, for small ϵ . The strategy sets
for each commodity are: Pp = {P1}, P
q = {P2, P4}, P
p′ = {P1, P3} and P
q′ = {P2}, where P1 = {1},
P2 = {2, 3}, P3 = {3, 4, 5} and P4 = {4, 6}. Note that each player has a fixed strategy for the first
commodity and two possible strategies for the second. Therefore there are four possible states.
We model this instance as a bimatrix game in Table 1, where player 1 is the row player and 2 the
column player. The costs are described as the sum of commodities’ costs for each player. We claim
that for any ϵ ∈
(
1
18
, 3
2
)
, there is no pure Nash equilibrium. □
We strengthen this result by showing non-existence of pure Nash equilibria even for network
congestion games under this setting. The proof uses the network in Figure 1.
Corollary 3.5. There is a network congestion game with multi-commodity players and cubic cost
functions that admits no pure Nash equilibrium under weighted Shapley value applied on commodity
weights.
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Table 2. Players’ costs in example of Corollary 3.5.
P1 P3
P2 20 + 8 5 + (13 − 9ϵ)
20 + 8 (16 − 9ϵ) + (13 − 9ϵ)
P4 20 + 7 5 + 13
20 + (2 − ϵ) (17 − 4ϵ) + (5 − 4ϵ)
P3 20 + (11 − 4ϵ) 5 + (37 − 9ϵ)
20 + (5 − 4ϵ) (37 − 9ϵ) + (10 − 9ϵ)
Proof. Consider the same set of players, commodities, resources and the associated cost func-
tions, with those described in the proof of Theorem 3.4. In addition, for each commodity z there
is a source-destination pair (sz , tz ) with at least one path between them. In total, we have the fol-
lowing seven paths in terms of edges: P1 = {(sp ,a), (a,b), (b, tp )}, P2 = {(sp′,a), (a,b), (b, tp′)}, P3 =
{(sp′ f ), (f ,д), (д,d), (d, e), (e, tp′)}, P4 = {(sq′, c), (c,d), (d, e), (e, tq′)}, P5 = {(sq , c), (c,d), (d, e), (e, tq)},
P6 = {(sq , f ), (f ,д), (д,d), (d, e), (e, tq)}, P7 = {(sq , f ), (f ,д), (д, tq)} and we see that the strategy
sets for each commodity are: Pp = {P1}, P
q = {P5, P6, P7}, P
p′ = {P2, P3} and P
q′ = {P4}. A
graphical interpretation of this network is given in Figure 1. Note that commodity q ∈ Q1 has an
additional strategy choice compared to the example of Theorem 3.4, therefore the total states are
increased to six. We now model this instance as a bimatrix game, given by Table 2, where player 1
is the row player and 2 the column player. Observe, that the additional strategy P7 for commodity
p is strictly dominated by P2 and P4, which implies the corollary. □
4 TIGHT POA BOUNDS FOR GENERAL COST-SHARING METHODS
In this section, we focus on the price of anarchy of congestion games with multi-commodity players
and prove general tight price of anarchy bounds, which are robust. More specifically, we prove
an upper bound that holds for the multi-commodity case and afterwards complement this with a
lower bound for the single-commodity case. This implies that the price of anarchy is the same both
in the single- and multi-commodity model.
Upper bound
We first generalize the (λ, µ)-smoothness framework of [31] to accommodate any cost-sharing
method and set of possible cost functions. For any set S , define f S to be the vector whose components
represent the flows of the players in S , and define as F S the sum of components of f S , that is
F S =
∑
i ∈S (f
S )i , ∀S . Suppose we identify positive parameters λ and µ < 1 such that for every cost
function in our allowable set C ∈ C, and every pair of sets of players T and T ∗, we get∑
i ∈T ∗
ξ (i, f T∪{i },C) ≤ λ ·C(FT
∗
) + µ ·C(FT ). (14)
Then, for P a PNE and P∗ the optimal solution, we would get
SC(P)
(1)
=
∑
i ∈N
∑
e ∈E
ξ (i, f Ne (P),Ce )
(2)
≤
∑
i ∈N
∑
e ∈E
ξ (i, f Ne (P
∗
i , P−i ),Ce ). (15)
To simplify, let Te and T
∗
e be the sets of players who assign positive flow on resource e on an
equilibrium outcome P and the optimal P∗, accordingly. Thus, Te = Se (P) and T
∗
e = Se (P
∗). Then
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(15) =
∑
e ∈E
∑
i ∈N
ξ (i, f Te∪{i }e (P
∗
i , P−i ),Ce )
(14)
≤
∑
e ∈E
λ ·Ce (F
T ∗e ) + µ ·Ce (F
Te )
=
∑
e ∈E
λ ·Ce
©­«
∑
i ∈T ∗e
(
f T
∗
e
)
i
ª®¬ + µ ·Ce
(∑
i ∈Te
(
f Te
)
i
)
=
∑
e ∈E
λ ·Ce (fe (P
∗)) + µ ·Ce (fe (P))
(1)
= λ · SC(P∗) + µ · SC(P). (16)
Rearranging (16) yields a λ/(1 − µ) upper bound on the PoA. The same bound can be easily shown
to apply to MNE and more general concepts (correlated and coarse correlated equilibria), though
we omit the details (see, e.g., [31] for more). We then get the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Consider the following optimization program with variables λ, µ.
Minimize
λ
1 − µ
(17)
Subject To µ ≤ 1 (18)∑
i ∈T ∗
ξ (i, f T∪{i },C) ≤ λ ·C(FT
∗
) + µ ·C(FT ), (19)
where constraint (19) needs to hold for any function C ∈ C, pair of sets T ,T ∗ ⊆ N and any positive
flow vector f S . Every feasible solution yields a λ/(1 − µ) upper bound on the PoA of the cost-sharing
method given by ξ (i, f S ,C) and the set of cost functions C.
The upper bound holds for any cost-sharing method and set of allowable cost functions.
Bound tightness
We now proceed to show that the optimal solution to Program (17)-(19) gives a tight upper bound
when our assumptions described in Section 2 hold. Observe that, since the PoA bound given by
Lemma 4.1 is given by the optimal point of the mathematical program, the PoA is either infinite or
a constant that does not depend on the number of players.
Theorem 4.2. Let (λ∗, µ∗) be the optimal point of Program (17)-(19). In congestion games with
multi-commodity players, the PoA of the cost-sharing method given by ξ (i, f S ,C) and the set of cost
functions C is precisely λ∗/(1 − µ∗) and equal to the PoA of the single-commodity case.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two parts. We first argue about strong duality of the mathematical
program that provides the upper bound and then present the lower bound construction.
Strong duality of the mathematical program. Define ζ (y,x ,C) for y,x > 0 as
ζ (y,x ,C) = max
T ∗:FT ∗=y, T :FT =x
∑
i ∈T ∗
ξ (i, f T∪{i },C). (20)
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With this definition, we can rewrite Program (17)-(19) as
Minimize
λ
1 − µ
(21)
Subject To µ ≤ 1 (22)
ζ (y,x ,C) ≤ λ ·C(y) + µ ·C(x), ∀C ∈ C and x ,y ∈ R>0. (23)
Observe that for every constraint, we can scale the weights of the players by a factor a, dilate the
cost function by a factor 1/a and scale it by an arbitrary factor, and keep the constraint intact (by
Assumption 2). This suggests we can assume that every constraint has y = 1 and C(1) = 1. Then
we rewrite Program (21)-(23) as
Minimize
λ
1 − µ
(24)
Subject To µ ≤ 1 (25)
ζ (1,x ,C) ≤ λ + µ ·C(x), ∀C ∈ C and x ∈ R>0. (26)
The Lagrangian dual of Program (24)-(26) is
Maximize inf
λ,µ
{
λ
1 − µ
+
∑
C ∈C,x>0
zCx · (ζ (1,x ,C) − λ − µ ·C(x)) + zµ · (µ − 1)
}
(27)
Subject To zCx , zµ ≥ 0. (28)
Our primal is a semi-infinite program with an objective that is continuous, differentiable, and
convex in the feasible region, and with linear constraints. We get that strong duality holds (see
also [35, 39] for a detailed treatment of strong duality in this setting). We first treat the case when the
optimal value of the primal is finite and is given by point (λ∗, µ∗). Before concluding our proof we
will explain how to deal with the case when the primal is infinite or infeasible. The KKT conditions
yield for the optimal λ∗, µ∗, z∗Cx :
1
1 − µ∗
=
∑
c ∈C,x>0
z∗Cx , (29)
λ∗
(1 − µ∗)2
=
∑
C ∈C,x>0
z∗Cx ·C(x). (30)
Calling ηCx = z
∗
Cx/
∑
C ∈C,x>0 z
∗
Cx and dividing (30) with (29) we get
λ∗
1 − µ∗
=
∑
C ∈C,x>0
ηCx ·C(x). (31)
By (31) and the fact that all constraints for which z∗Cx > 0 are tight (by complementary slackness),
we get ∑
C ∈C,x>0
ηCx · ζ (1,x ,C) =
∑
C ∈C,x>0
ηCx ·C(x). (32)
We now proceed to our matching lower bound which holds even for the single-commodity per
player model.
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Lower bound construction. The construction starts off with a single-commodity player i , who has
flow 1 and, in the PNE, uses a single resource ei by herself. The cost function of resource ei is an
arbitrary function from C such that Cei (1) , 0 (it is easy to see that such a function exists, since C
is closed under dilation, unless all function are 0, which is a trivial case) scaled so that Cei (1) =∑
(C,x )∈T ηCx ·ζ (1,x ,C). The other option of player i is to use a set of resources, one for each (C,x) ∈
T with cost functions ηCx ·C(·). The resource corresponding to each (C,x) is used in the PNE by a
player set that is equivalent to theT that maximizes the expression in (20) for the correspondingC,x .
We now prove that player i does not gain by deviating to her alternative strategy. The key point is
that due to convexity of the cost shares (Assumption 3), the worst case T ∗ in definition (20) will
always be a single player. Then we can see that the cost share of i on each (C,x) resource in her
potential deviation will be ηCx · ζ (1,x ,C). It then follows that she is indifferent between her two
strategies. Note that the PNE cost of i is
∑
(C,x )∈T ηCx · ζ (1,x ,C), which by (31) and (32) is equal
to λ∗/(1− µ∗). Also note that if player i could use her alternative strategy by herself, her cost would
be 1.
We now make the following observation which allows us to complete the lower bound construc-
tion: Focus on the players and resources of the previous paragraph. Suppose we scale the weight of
player i , as well as the weights of the users of the resources in her alternative strategy by the same
factor a > 0. Then, suppose we dilate the cost functions of all these resources (the one used by i in
the PNE and the ones in her alternative strategy) by a factor 1/a so that the costs generated by the
players go back to the values they had in the previous paragraph. Finally, suppose we scale the cost
functions by an arbitrary factor b > 0. We observe that the fact that i has no incentive to deviate is
preserved (by Assumption 2, page 7) and the ratio of PNE cost versus alternative cost for i remains
the same, i.e., λ∗/(1 − µ∗). This suggests that for every player generated by our construction so far
in the PNE, we can repeat these steps by looking at her weight and PNE cost and appropriately
constructing her alternative strategy and the users therein. After repeating this construction for a
large number of layersM → ∞, we complete the instance by creating a single resource for each of
the players in the final layer. The cost functions of these resources are arbitrary nonzero functions
from C scaled and dilated so that each one of these players is indifferent between her PNE strategy
and using the newly constructed resource.
Consider the outcome that has all players play their alternative strategies and not the ones they
use in the PNE. Every player other than the ones in the final layer would have a cost λ∗/(1 − µ∗)
smaller, as we argued above. We can now see that, by (32), the cost of every player in the PNE is
the same as that of the players in the resources of her alternative strategy. This means the cost
across levels of our construction is identical and the final layer is negligible, sinceM → ∞. This
proves that the cost of the PNE is λ∗/(1 − µ∗) times larger than the outcome that has all players
play their alternative strategies, which gives the tight lower bound.
Note on case with primal infeasibility. Recall that during our analysis we assumed that the
primal program (24)-(26) had a finite optimal solution. Now suppose the program is either infeasible
or µ = 1, which means the minimizer yields an infinite value. This implies that, if we set µ arbitrarily
close to 1, then there exists someC ∈ C, such that, for any arbitrarily large λ, there exists x > 0 such
that ζ (1,x ,C) > λ + µ ·C(x). We can rewrite this last expression as ζ (1,x ,C)/C(x) > µ + λ/C(x),
which shows we have valuesC and x such that ζ (1,x ,C) is arbitrarily close toC(x) or larger (since µ
is arbitrarily close to 1). We can then replace λ with λ′ such that the constraint becomes tight. It is
not hard to see that these facts give properties parallel to (31) and (32) by setting ηCx = 1 for our
C and x and every other such variable to 0. Then our lower bound construction goes through for
this arbitrarily large λ′/(1 − µ), which shows we can construct a lower bound with as high PoA as
desired. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2. □
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5 POS FORWEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES
In this section we study the price of stability for a class of weighted Shapley values, where the
sampling parameter of each player i is defined by λi (P) = (f
i
e (P))
γ
for any γ and outcome P .
PoS upper bound for Shapley values (γ = 0)
We start with an upper bound on the PoS for the case that γ = 0, i.e., for the Shapley value (SV)
cost-sharing method, which is tight for the interesting subclass of polynomial cost functions.
Theorem 5.1. In congestion games with multi-commodity players, the PoS under the Shapley value
cost-sharing method is at most
max
C ∈C,x>0
C(x)∫ x
0
C(x ′)
x ′ dx
′
,
where C the set of allowable cost functions.
Proof. We begin with the potential function of the game:
Φ(P) =
∑
e ∈E
∑
i ∈N
ξ (i, f ≤i,πe (P),Ce )
and we prove the following lemma which is the main tool for proving our upper bound on the PoS.
Briefly, the lemma states the following. For any instance with N players and any strategy profile,
we can construct a new instance with N + 1 players by splitting one player in half into two new
players. Then this can only reduce the potential value of the game. More precisely, we do this by
splitting in half the flow of each commodity controlled by a player i on a resource creating two
new commodities, which we assign to the new two players, say i ′ and i ′′.
Lemma 5.2. Consider an outcome P of the game and assume that on a resource e , we substitute
the total flow of a player i with the flows of two other players i ′,i ′′ such that f i
′
e (P̂) = f
i′′
e (P̂) =
f ie (P )
2
.
Then we claim that
Φe (P) ≥ Φ
′
e (P̂),
where Φ′e (P̂) is the potential value of resource e after the substitution.
Proof. First, rename the flows such that the substituted one f ie (P) to have the highest index.
Assign indices i ′ and i ′′ to the new ones, with i < i ′ < i ′′ in ordering π . Then, for any resource e ,
the new potential value equals to
Φ′e (P̂) =
i−1∑
j=1
ξ (j, f ≤j,πe (P),Ce ) + ξ (i
′, (f <i,πe (P), f
i′
e (P̂)),Ce ) + ξ (i
′′, (f <i,πe (P), f
i′
e (P̂), f
i′′
e (P̂)),Ce ).
Note that the contribution to the potential value of the flows before player’s i flow is the same as
before the substitution. Therefore it is enough to show that
ξ (i, f Ne (P),Ce ) ≥ ξ (i
′, (f <i,πe (P), f
i′
e (P̂)),Ce ) + ξ (i
′′, (f <i,πe (P), f
i′
e (P̂), f
i′′
e (P̂)),Ce ). (33)
To simplify, in what follows call χ = ξ (i, f Ne (P),Ce ), χ
′ = ξ (i ′, (f <i,πe (P), f
i′
e (P̂)),Ce ) and χ
′′ =
ξ (i ′′, (f <i,πe (P), f
i′
e (P̂), f
i′′
e (P̂)),Ce ). Define as S
i
e (π ) the set of players preceding player i in π . Then,
for every ordering π and permutation τ i of set S ie (π ) ∪ {i}, define as F
<i,π ,τ i
e (P) the sum of players’
flows who precede i in both π and τ i . Let now |Se (P)| = r . By definition of SV, we get
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χ =
1
r !
∑
τ i
(
Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i
e (P)
)
−Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P))
))
, (34)
χ ′ =
1
r !
∑
τ i
(
Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i′
e (P̂)
)
−Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P)
))
. (35)
For χ ′′, since the position of f i
′
e (P̂) in the ordering is unspecified, we give an upper bound for
this value as follows. For any permutation τ , letA(τ ) be the marginal cost increase caused by f i
′′
e (P̂)
when she precedes f i
′
e (P̂) in π , and B(τ ) when she succeeds. That is
A(τ ) = Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i′′
e (P̂)
)
−Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P)
)
,
B(τ ) = Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i′
e (P̂) + f
i′′
e (P̂)
)
−Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i′
e (P̂)
)
. (36)
Let now p equal the probability of f i
′
e (P̂) preceding f
i′′
e (P̂). Then SV definition gives
χ ′′ = (1 − p) ·
1
r !
·
∑
τ i
A(τ ) + p ·
1
r !
·
∑
τ i
B(τ ). (37)
Due to convexity, A(τ ) ≤ B(τ ). Therefore, by substituting A(τ ) with B(τ ) in definition (37), we get
the following upper bound for χ ′′,
χ ′′ ≤
1
r !
∑
τ i
B(τ ). (38)
Towards proving inequality (33), we have
χ ′ + χ ′′
(35), (38)
≤
1
r !
∑
τ i
Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i′′
e (P̂)
)
−Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P)
)
+
+Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i′
e (P̂) + f
i′′
e (P̂)
)
−Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i′
e (P̂)
)
.
Since f i
′
e (P̂) = f
i′′
e (P̂) =
f ie (P )
2
, we get
χ ′ + χ ′′ ≤
1
r !
∑
τ i
(
Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P) + f
i
e (P)
)
−Ce
(
F <i,π ,τ
i
e (P)
))
(34)
= χ ,
as desired. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2. □
We now continue with the PoS upper bound. By repeatedly applying Lemma 5.2, we can break
the total flow on each resource in identical flows of infinitesimal size without increasing the value
of the potential. This implies that
Φe (P) ≥
∫ fe (P )
0
Ce (x)
x
dx . (39)
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article TEAC-D-18-00044R1. Publication date: 2020.
TEAC-D-18-00044R1:18 M. Gairing, K. Kollias and G. Kotsialou
Now call P∗ the optimal outcome and P = arg minP ′ Φ(P
′) the minimizer of the potential function,
which is, by definition, also a PNE. Then
SC(P∗)
(??)
≥ Φ(P∗)
Def.P
≥ Φ(P)
(39)
≥
∑
e ∈E
∫ fe (P )
0
Ce (x)
x
dx
=
∑
e ∈E
∫ fe (P )
0
Ce (x )
x dx∑
e ∈E Ce (fe (P))
· SC(P) ≥ min
e ∈E
∫ fe (P )
0
Ce (x )
x dx
Ce (fe (P))
· SC(P). (40)
Rearranging (40) yields the upper bound PoS ≤ maxC ∈C,x>0
C(x )∫ x
0
C (x ′)
x ′ dx
′
, which completes the proof
of Theorem 5.1. □
Corollary 5.3. For polynomials with non-negative coefficients and degree at most d , the PoS of the
SV is at most d + 1.
Remark 5.4. From Corollary 5.3 and the corresponding lower bound from [7] it follows that the PoS
of the SV is Θ(d).
PoS for weighted Shapley values (γ , 0)
In the remainder of this section, we show that this linear dependence on the maximum degree
d of the polynomial cost functions is very fragile. More precisely, for all values γ , 0, we show
an exponential (in d) lower bound on the PoA, which asymptotically matches the corresponding
upper bound by Gkatzelis et al. [15]. For γ > 0, our bound exactly matches the upper bound in [15],
which holds for the weighted Shapley value in general. Our lower bound constructions hold for the
single-commodity model and modify the corresponding instances from [15], making sure that they
have a unique Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.5. In congestion games with single-commodity players and polynomial cost functions
with non-negative coefficients and maximum degree d , the PoS for the class of weighted Shapley values
with sampling parameters λie (P) = (f
i
e (P))
γ is at least
(a) (2
1
d − 1)−d , for all γ > 0, and
(b) dd , for all γ < 0.
In the following we prove Theorem 5.5. To do so, we first show a technical lemma, which will be
crucial for proving our lower bounds on the PoS. We then introduce an instance in Example 5.7
and show in Theorem 5.8 that it gives the lower bound for γ > 0. Afterwards, Example 5.9 and
Theorem 5.10 provide the corresponding lower bound for γ < 0.
Lemma 5.6. Consider a resource e , a player i with flow f ie and a setT of k players with total weight
FTe , where f
t
e =
FTe
k for t ∈ T . Assume that the set of players {i} ∪ T
′, for some T ′ ⊆ T , is using a
resource where players’ cost shares are computed by weighted Shapley values with sampling weights
λz (f
z
e ) = (f
z
e )
γ , for each player z. Let j ∈ T ′. Then (a) for γ > 0
lim
k→∞
χie =Ce
(
|T ′ | ·
FTe
k
+ f ie
)
−Ce
(
|T ′ | · f je
)
, (41)
lim
k→∞
χje =
1
|T ′ |
·Ce
(
|T ′ | ·
FTe
k
)
, if |T ′ | , ∅, (42)
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and, (b) for γ < 0
lim
k→∞
χie = Ce (f
i
e ), (43)
lim
k→∞
χje =
1
|T ′ |
·
(
Ce
(
|T ′ | ·
FTe
k
+ f ie
)
−Ce
(
f ie
) )
, if |T ′ | , ∅. (44)
Proof. First, notice that if |T ′ | = ∅, equations (41) and (43) of the lemma follow immediately,
since only player i uses the resource. We now prove the lemma for the case where |T ′ | , 0.
(a) Assume that the sampling weights are given by λz (f
z ) = (f z )γ for γ > 0 and let k → ∞.
We show that player i is the last player who enters the resource with probability 1 − o(1), i.e., she
is among the first δ · (|T ′ | + 1) players being drawn by the sampling procedure, for any arbitrary
small δ > 0. Consider now the probability p that player i is not among the first δ · (|T ′ | + 1) drawn
players. Then p is upper bounded by the probability that player i is not drawn among everyone in
set {i} ∪T ′ for δ · (|T ′ | + 1) times,
p ≤
©­­«1 −
f ie
f ie + |T ′ | ·
(
FTe
k
)γ ª®®¬
δ ·( |T ′ |+1)
. (45)
Let β = |T
′ |
|T | =
|T ′ |
k where β ∈ (0, 1]. By substituting in (45), we have
©­­«1 −
f ie
f ie + β · k ·
(
FTe
k
)γ ª®®¬
δ ·(β ·k+1)
=
(
1 −
f ie
f ie + β · k1−γ · (F
T
e )
γ
)δ ·(β ·k+1)
. (46)
For γ ≥ 1, we have
(46) ≤
(
1 −
f ie
f ie + (F
T
e )
γ
)δ ·(β ·k+1)
which goes to 0 as k → ∞. Since (1 − x) ≤ e−x , we have for all 0 < γ < 1,
(46) ≤ exp
(
−δ · β · k ·
f ie
f ie + β · k1−γ · (F
T
e )
γ
)
= exp
©­­«−δ · β ·
f ie
f ie
k + β ·
(
FTe
k
)γ ª®®¬ ,
which also goes to 0 as k → ∞. Therefore probability p is upper bounded by an arbitrarily small ϵ .
According to the weighted Shapley value method, the cost share of a player equals the expected
marginal contribution she causes to the resource cost. Thus her cost share is affected by any player
who enters resource before her. For any small δ > 0, player i is with probability 1 − o(1) among the
last δ · (|T ′ | + 1) players who enter the resource. Therefore her cost share is affected by the players
who enter the resource earlier. Thus player i incurs a cost of
lim
k→∞
χie = Ce (|T
′ | · f je + f
i
e ) −Ce (|T
′ | · f je )
= Ce
(
|T ′ | ·
FTe
k
+ f ie
)
−Ce
(
|T ′ | ·
FTe
k
)
.
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In contrast, the cost of each player j ∈ T ′ is not affected by the flow of player i . Therefore for each
j ∈ T ′, we have
lim
k→∞
χje =
1
|T ′ |
·Ce (|T
′ | · f je ) =
1
|T ′ |
·Ce
(
|T ′ | ·
FTe
k
)
which completes the first part of the proof.
(b) Assume now that the sampling weights are given by λ(f z ) = (f z )γ for γ < 0 and let k → ∞.
We prove that, for any δ > 0, player i is, with probability 1 − o(1), among the first δ · (|T ′ | + 1)
players entering the resource. This probability equals the probability that player i is not drawn
for the first (1 − δ ) · (|T ′ | + 1) sampling rounds. The following formula gives the probability that a
player i is not drawn for the first q sampling rounds:
q∏
r=1
©­­«1 −
f ie
f ie + (|T ′ | − (r − 1)) ·
(
FTe
k
)γ ª®®¬ . (47)
The probability of a player i being drawn increases with the number of sampling rounds. This
implies that the probability of player i not being drawn becomes the smallest in the last sampling
round. That is, when r = q = (1−δ ) · (|T ′ | + 1), we get the smallest term of (47). Thus we can lower
bound (47) by
©­­«1 −
f ie
f ie + (δ · |T ′ | + 1) ·
(
FTe
k
)γ ª®®¬
(1−δ )·( |T ′ |+1)
. (48)
Define β = |T
′ |
|T | =
|T ′ |
k where β ∈ (0, 1]. By substituting in (48), we have
©­­«1 −
f ie
f ie + (δ · β · k + 1) ·
(
FTe
k
)γ ª®®¬
(1−δ )·(β ·k+1)
which is lower bounded by (
1 −
f ie
f ie + δ · β · k1−γ · (F
T
e )
γ
)
2·β ·k
(49)
since β ≥ 1k (due to |T
′ | , ∅ in this case). By letting k → ∞, we get that
lim
k→∞
(49) ≥ lim
k→∞
(
1 −
f ie
δ · β · k1−γ · (FTe )γ
)
2·β ·k1−γ ·kγ
. (50)
To simplify, let x =
f ie
δ ·(FTe )γ
. Then (50) equals to
lim
k→∞
((
1 −
x
β · k1−γ
)β ·k1−γ −1
·
(
1 −
x
β · k1−γ
))2·kγ
. (51)
Since (1 − xn )
n−1 ≥ e−x for any positive x and n, we lower-bound (51) by
lim
k→∞
(
e−x ·
(
1 −
x
β · k1−γ
))
2·kγ
which equals to 1 for any γ < 0.
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As we mention in part (a) of the proof, the cost share of a player under the weighted Shapley
value method equals to the marginal contribution she causes to the resource cost. As we proved,
player i is the first player who enters the resource with probability 1−o(1). Therefore her cost share
is not affected by any player who enters after her. Even if some of the players in T ′ are introduced
before player i in the resource, they will negligible affect player i’s cost. This is due to the fact that
f je =
FTe
k → 0 for any player j ∈ T
′
, since k → ∞. Therefore the cost share of player i is given by
χie = Ce (f
i
e )
while the cost share of any player j ∈ T ′ is given by
lim
k→∞
χje =
1
|T ′ |
·
(
Ce
(
f ie + |T
′ | · f je
)
−Ce
(
f ie
) )
=
1
|T ′ |
·
(
Ce
(
f ie + |T
′ | ·
FTe
k
)
−Ce
(
f ie
) )
,
since they enter resource after player i , which completes the proof of the Lemma 5.6. □
Lower bound for positive γ
In this section, we give the proof for part (a) of Theorem 5.5. First, we describe the example that
gives our lower bound, for γ > 0, which is stated in Theorem 5.8 afterwards.
Example 5.7. Consider a complete k-ary treeG = (E,N )with l levels, where the root is positioned
at level 0. Each vertex of the tree corresponds to a resource and each edge to a player. For 0 ≤ j ≤ l−1,
let Ej ⊂ E be the set of resources (nodes) at level j and, for 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 2, let Nj ⊂ N be the set
of players (edges) between levels j and j + 1 of the tree. The strategies of every player are the
endpoints of the edge she is associated with, i.e. a player associated with edge (j, j−1) has strategies
{{j}, {j − 1}}. For 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 2, the flow f i of a player i ∈ Nj is given by ϕ
l−j−2
, where
ϕ = k ·
(
2
1
d − 1
)
. (52)
Define α = kϕd and let 0 < ϵ < 1. The cost function of resources e ∈ Ej , is given by
Ce (x) =
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· α l−j−2 · xd ,
and Ce (x) = (1 + ϵ) · k
d−1 · xd ,
for 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 2,
for j = l − 1.
Theorem 5.8. In congestion games with single-commodity players and polynomial cost functions
with non-negative coefficients and maximum degree d , the PoS for the class of weighted Shapley values
with sampling parameters λi (f i ) = (f i )γ , with γ > 0, is at least(
2
1
d − 1
)−d
.
Proof. Consider the instance in Example 5.7. Then, let P be the outcome where all players use
the resource closer to the root, and P∗ be the outcome where all players use the resource further
from the root. We prove by induction that P is a unique Nash equilibrium with a total cost equal to
(2
1
d − 1)−d times the total cost of outcome P∗.
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Consider a player i ∈ Nl−2, i.e. a player connected to a leaf resource and assume she uses the leaf
resource, e ∈ El−1. Note that she is the only player who can use this resource. Then player i’s cost
share equals to
χie = (1 + ϵ) · k
d−1. (53)
For k ′ ≤ k , consider k ′ players from set Nl−2 (including player i) and assume they use the resource
e closer to the root, e ∈ El−2. Choose the (worst) case where a player b ∈ Nl−3 also uses resource e .
We show that even in this case, player i prefers the resource closer to the root. Using (42) of Lemma
5.6, player i’s cost share is given by
lim
k→∞
χie =
1
k ′
·
(
1 + ϵ2
)
· α · (k ′ · ϕ)d
k ′≤k
≤
(
1 + ϵ2
)
· kd−1, (54)
where (54) is strictly smaller than (53), since 0 < ϵ < 1.
For l − 1 ≥ j ′ ≥ j + 1, assume that each player of set Nj′ uses the strategy closer to the root,
e ∈ Ej′ . Then consider a player i ∈ Nj who uses the resource e further from the root, e ∈ Ej+1. By
assumption, this resource is also used by k players from set Nj+1. Then, using (41) of Lemma 5.6,
player i’s cost share is given by
lim
k→∞
χie =
(
1 + ϵ l−j−1
)
· α l−j−3 ·
((
k · ϕl−j−3 + ϕl−j−2
)d
−
(
k · ϕl−j−3
)d )
=
(
1 + ϵ l−j−1
)
· α l−j−3 · kd · ϕd ·(l−j−3) ·
((
1 +
ϕ
k
)d
− 1d
)
.
=
(
1 + ϵ l−j−1
)
·
(
α · ϕd
) l−j−3
· kd .
By substituting α , we have
lim
k→∞
χie = (1 + ϵ
l−j−1) · (kl−j−3+d ). (55)
For k ′ ≤ k , consider k ′ players from set Nj (including player i) and assume they use the resource e
closer to the root, e ∈ Ej . Choose the (worst) case where one player b ∈ Nj−1 also uses resource e .
Then we show that player i still prefers to use resource e ∈ Ej . By (42) of Lemma 5.6, i’s cost share
equals to
lim
k→∞
χie =
1
k ′
·
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· α l−j−2 ·
(
k ′ · ϕl−j−2
)d
=
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· α l−j−2 · (k ′)d−1 · ϕd ·(l−j−2)
k ′≤k
≤
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
·
(
α · ϕd
) l−j−2
· kd−1. (56)
By substituting α , we have
lim
k→∞
χie ≤
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· kl−j−3+d ,
which is strictly smaller than (55), since 0 < ϵ < 1.
PoS. Let P and P∗ be the outcomes where each player chooses the strategy closer and further
from the root respectively. In this section, we compute the total costs of outcomes P and P∗, and
present a lower bound to the PoS.
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For outcome P, since every player chooses the resource closer to the root, no player uses any
resource e ∈ El−1, therefore the cost at the leaves of the tree is zero. For 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 2, we proved
that each player using a resource e ∈ Ej incurs a cost of
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· kl−j−3+d . Since each of the k j
resources in Ej is used by k players, the total cost at level j equals to∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) = k
j+1 ·
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· kl−j−3+d
=
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
·
(
kl−2+d
)
.
Summing up for the l levels, we get that the social cost in outcome P equals to
SC(P) =
l−1∑
j=0
∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) = k
l−2+d ·
(
l − 1 +
l∑
i=2
ϵ i
)
. (57)
For outcome P∗, we now compute the cost of each player on each level. Since every player chooses
to use the resource further from the root, the cost of resource e ∈ E0 is zero. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 2, each
player using a resource e ∈ Ej incurs a cost of(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· α l−j−2 · ϕ(l−j−1)·d =
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
·
(
α · ϕd
) l−j−2
· ϕd =
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· kl−j−2 · ϕd .
In this case, each of the k j resources in Ej is used by only one player, therefore the total cost at
level j equals to ∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) = k
j ·
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
·
(
kl−j−2
)
=
(
1 + ϵ l−j
)
· kl−2 · ϕd . (58)
Last, the cost of each player using a leaf resource, e ∈ El−1, equals to (1 + ϵ) · k
d−1
. Since there are
kl−1 leaf resources, the total cost at level l − 1 equals to∑
e ∈El−1
Ce (fe (P)) = k
l−1 · (1 + ϵ) · kd−1 = (1 + ϵ) ·
(
kl−2+d
)
. (59)
Summing up for the l levels, we have that the social cost in outcome P∗ equals to
SC(P∗) =
l−1∑
j=0
∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) =
l−2∑
j=1
∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) +
∑
e ∈El−1
Ce (fe (P))
(58), (59)
= kl−2 · ϕd ·
(
l − 2 +
l∑
i=2
ϵ i
)
+ (1 + ϵ) · kl−2+d
(52)
= kl−2+d ·
((
2
1
d − 1
)d
·
(
l − 2 +
l∑
i=2
ϵ i
)
+ 1 + ϵ
)
. (60)
Using (57) and (60), the PoS is lower bounded by
SC(P)
SC(P∗)
=
l − 1 +
∑l
i=2 ϵ
i(
2
1
d − 1
)d
·
(
l − 2 +
∑l−1
i=2 ϵ
i
)
+ 1 + ϵ
As l → ∞ and ϵ is arbitrary small, this ratio goes to
(
2
1
d − 1
)−d
, as desired. □
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Lower bound for negative γ .
In this section, we give the proof for part (b) of Theorem 5.5. First, we describe the example that
gives our lower bound, for γ < 0, which is stated in Theorem 5.10 afterwards.
Example 5.9. Consider a complete k-ary treeG = (E,N )with l levels, where the root is positioned
at level 0. Each vertex of the tree corresponds to a resource and each edge to a single-commodity
player. For 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 1, let Ej ⊂ E be the set of resources (nodes) at level j, and, for 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 2,
let Nj ⊂ N be the set of players (edges) between levels j and j + 1 of the tree. The strategies of
every player are the endpoints of the edge she is associated with, i.e. a player associated with edge
(j, j − 1) has strategies {{j}, {j − 1}}. The flow of a player i ∈ Nj is given by ϕ
j
, where
ϕ =
1
k · d
. (61)
Define α = kd−1 · dd . The cost function of resources e ∈ Ej , is given by
Ce (x) = (1 + ϵ) · x
d ,
and Ce (x) =
(
1 + ϵ j+1
)
· α j−1 · xd ,
for j = 0,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1.
where ϵ is an arbitrarily small parameter.
Theorem 5.10. In congestion games with single-commodity players and polynomial cost functions
with non-negative coefficients and maximum degree d , the PoS for the class of weighted Shapley values
with sampling parameters λi (f i ) = (f i )γ , with γ < 0, is at least dd .
Proof. Choose the instance described in Example 5.9. Then, let P be the outcome where all
players use the resource further from the root, and P∗ be the outcome where all players use the
resource closer to the root. We prove by induction that P is a unique Nash equilibrium with a total
cost equal to dd times the total cost of outcome P∗.
For k ′ ≤ k , consider k ′ players from set N0 including a player i and assume they use the resource
on the root, e ∈ E0. Then player i’s cost share equals to
lim
k→∞
χie =
1
k ′
·Ce (fe (P)) =
1
k
· (1 + ϵ) · (k ′)d
k ′≥1
≥ 1 + ϵ . (62)
Assume now that player i deviates to resource e further from the root, e ∈ E1, and she uses this
resource together with k ′ players from set N1, for k
′ ≤ k . By (43) of Lemma 5.6, player i’s cost
share is given by
lim
k→∞
χie =
(
1 + ϵ2
)
· 1d = 1 + ϵ2
for large enough k , which is strictly lower than (62).
For 0 ≤ j ′ ≤ j − 2, assume that each player of set Nj′ uses the strategy further from the root,
e ∈ Ej′+1. For k
′ ≤ k , consider k ′ players from set Nj−1 including a player i , and assume they use
the resource e closer to the root, e ∈ Ej−1. By assumption, this resource is also used by one player
b ∈ Nj−2. We show that player i prefers to deviate. Using (44) of Lemma 5.6, player i incurs a cost of
lim
k→∞
χie =
1
k ′
·
(
1 + ϵ j
)
· α j−2 ·
( (
k ′ · ϕ j−1 + ϕ j−2
)d
− ϕ(j−2)·d
)
k ′≥1
≥
(
1 + ϵ j
)
· α j−2 ·
( (
ϕ j−1 + ϕ j−2
)d
− ϕ(j−2)·d
)
=
(
1 + ϵ j
)
· α j−2 · ϕ(j−2)·d ·
(
(ϕ + 1)d − 1
)
. (63)
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Define function д(x) = xd . Since д is convex and ϕ → 0, we have that
(ϕ + 1)d − 1 ≥ ϕ · d .
Using the above inequality, we get
lim
k→∞
χie ≥ (63) ≥
(
1 + ϵ j
)
· (α · ϕd )j−2 · ϕ · d
=
(
1 + ϵ j
)
·
(
1
k
) j−2
·
1
k · d
· d
=
(
1 + ϵ j
)
·
1
k j−1
. (64)
Assume now that player i deviates to resource e further from the root, e ∈ Ej . Choose the case
where k ′ players from set Nj also use this resource e , for a k
′ ≤ k . Then by (43) of Lemma, player
i’s cost share is given by
lim
k→∞
χie =
(
1 + ϵ j+1
)
· α j−1 ·
(
ϕ j−1
)d
=
(
1 + ϵ j+1
)
·
1
k j−1
,
which is strictly lower than (64).
PoS. First, we compute the total cost of the outcome P . Since every player chooses the resource
further from the root, the cost of resource e ∈ E0 (root) is zero. As we proved, each player using a
resource e ∈ Ej incurs a cost of
(
1 + ϵ j+1
)
· 1k j−1 , for 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1. Each of the k
j
resources in Ej is
used by only one player. Therefore the total cost at level j equals to∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) = k
j ·
(
1 + ϵ j+1
)
·
1
k j−1
=
(
1 + ϵ j+1
)
· k .
Computing the sum for the l levels, we have that the cost of outcome P equals
SC(P) =
l−1∑
j=0
∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) = k ·
(
l − 1 +
l∑
i=2
ϵ i
)
. (65)
Now let P∗ be the outcome where each player chooses the resource closer to the root. The cost
of level l − 1 (leaves) of the tree is zero. The cost at level 0 is (1 + ϵ) · kd . For 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 2, each
resource e ∈ Ej incurs a cost of
(1 + ϵ j+1) · α j−1 ·
(
k · ϕ j
)d
= (1 + ϵ j+1) · α j−1 · kd · (ϕ j−1 · ϕ)d
= (1 + ϵ j+1) · (α ·wd )j−1 · (k · ϕ)d
= (1 + ϵ j+1) ·
1
k j−1 · dd
.
Since there are k j resources in Ej , the total cost of level j of the tree is given by∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) = k
j · (1 + ϵ j+1) ·
1
k j−1 · dd
=
(
1 + ϵ j+1
)
·
k
dd
.
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Summing up for all levels, we get that the social cost in outcome P∗ equals to
SC(P∗) =
l−1∑
j=0
∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P)) =
∑
e ∈E0
Ce (fe (P)) +
l−1∑
j=1
∑
e ∈Ej
Ce (fe (P))
= (1 + ϵ) · kd +
(
l − 1 +
l∑
i=2
ϵ i
)
·
k
dd
. (66)
Using (65) and (66), the PoS is lower bounded by the following ratio
SC(P)
SC(P∗)
=
k ·
(
l − 1 +
∑l
i=2 ϵ
i
)
(1 + ϵ) · kd +
(
l − 1 +
∑l
i=2 ϵ
i
)
· kdd
=
l − 1 +
∑l
i=2 ϵ
i
(1 + ϵ) · kd−1 +
(
l − 1 +
∑l
i=2 ϵ
i
)
· 1dd
.
With l → ∞ and ϵ → 0, this ratio goes to dd for any k , which completes the proof of Theorem 5.10.
□
6 CONCLUSION
In this work we conducted a complete study of cost-sharing methods in weighted congestion games.
We characterized the price of anarchy and price of stability for general classes of cost functions and
cost methods and extended our results to generalizations of congestion games where each player
can control multiple commodities. The main conceptual messages coming out of our work are that:
• these generalized congestion games are tight and robust with respect to the price of anarchy
in a very general framework of cost functions and cost-sharing methods.
• the Shapley value maintains strong properties in weighted and generalized congestion games
as it guarantees the existence of pure Nash equilibria and (almost) minimizes the price of
stability.
• weighted variants of the Shapley value do not fare as well, since they either fail to maintain
pure Nash equilibrium existence (when moving to multiple commodities per player) or have
a much higher price of stability than the unweighted Shapley value (both for standard and
generalized weighted congestion games).
Our work provides a complete understanding in the case of generalized weighted congestion
games and it is interesting to explore the landscape in the related framework of splittable congestion
games [10, 18, 23, 28, 32]. In splittable congestion games with multi-commodity players, the weight
of a commodity can be split among its strategies. A result from Orda et al. [28] implies the existence
of pure Nash equilibria in the multi-commodity splittable model, if the cost share of a player on a
resource is a convex function of her flow on the resource. This result [28] is based on the Kakutani
Fixed Point theorem. This immediately gives us existence of pure Nash equilibria for the standard
Shapley value. Furthermore, we have observed that simple examples can show this is not the case
for variants of the Shapley value that impose predefined orderings on the players. In this setting, it
is interesting to focus on open questions which include:
• How do the price of anarchy and price of stability behave for different cost-sharing methods
and classes of cost functions?
• For which classes of cost-sharing methods is existence of a pure Nash equilibrium guaranteed?
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